## WARCOUNCIL.ORG: 300 Word Strategic Education,v2

By Major Matt Cavanaugh

Master these 300 words - 50 concepts, 6 words each - to maximize strategic competency with minimum time investment. This study enables Clausewitzian Critical Analysis, which in simplified form compares a strategic concept with evidence from a conflict (cause), and then judges impact on the combatants willingness or ability to fight (effect). Example: At the end of the Pacific War, American airpower and seapower severely constrained Japanese tactical resources (cause), which aided American island hopping and policy achievement (effect).

| Studying War                          |  |  |
|---------------------------------------|--|--|
| Strategic Studies                     | Multi-disciplinary study of threat and force.    |  |
| Cognitive Biases in Strategic Studies | Humans seek simplicity in security decisions.    |  |
| Strategic Understanding               | Intellectually links tactical action and policy. |  |
| Strategic Thinking                    | Habitual ends to means mental contrasting.       |  |

| Levels of Analysis  |   |  |
|---------------------|---|--|
| Tactics             | Combatant instruments of power in action.               |  |
| Operations          | Tactics ordered in time, space, purpose.                |  |
| Strategy            | Balances ends, ways, means and risk.1                   |  |
| Strategy            | Bridge between tactical action and policy. <sup>2</sup> |  |
| Grand Strategy      | Relates national means to large ends. <sup>3</sup>      |  |
| Policy and Purpose) | Desired ends as decided by politics.4                   |  |
| Strategic Effect    | Impact on opponent fighting capability, will.           |  |

| Foundational Terms             |   |  |
|--------------------------------|---|--|
| War                            | Intense, reciprocal, public violence for purpose. <sup>5</sup>        |  |
| Clausewitz: Description of War | Trinity of violence, chance, and policy.                              |  |
| Security Dilemma               | Impossible to gauge opponent hostile intent.                          |  |
| Ultimate Object in War         | Sustainable political outcome consistent with interests. <sup>6</sup> |  |
| American View of War           | Anticipate success against direct hostile threat. <sup>7</sup>        |  |
| National Interest              | Enduring national goals: security, values, prosperity.                |  |
| National Power                 | Always relative, hard coercion, soft persuasion.8                     |  |
| Civil Military Relations       | Warrior-citizen interaction in strategic affairs.                     |  |

| Common (Mostly Non-State) Force Employment |  |  |
|--|--|--|
| Insurgent                                  | Seeks new authority through violent rebellion.                   |  |
| Counterinsurgency                          | Suppresses armed rebellion; supports existing authority.         |  |
| Terrorism                                  | Indiscriminate, premeditated, sensational, politically motivated |  |
|  | violence.  |  |
| Hybrid Warfare                             | Fused mix of multiple strategic behaviors.9                      |  |

<sup>2</sup> Colin Gray, *The Strategy Bridge* <sup>3</sup> John Gaddis, "What is Grand Strategy?"

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Arthur Lykke, "Toward an Undertanding of Military Strategy"

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Colin Gray, *The Strategy Bridge* 

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Rob Johnson, *Changing Character of War Programme*, Oxford University

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> H.R. McMaster, "Ground Forces Dialogue," CSIS

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Chicago Council on Global Affairs, "Survey of American Public Opinion and US Foreign Policy"

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> Joseph Nye, The Future of Power

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> Frank Hoffman, "Hybrid Warfare and Challenges"

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| Geographic Military Domains  |   |
|--|---|
| Landpower  | Gains, sustains, controls - land, resources, people. <sup>10</sup>          |
| Seapower   | National sea-based capacity to shape events. <sup>11</sup>                  |
| Airpower   | Ability to control airspace for purpose.                                    |
| Marine Corps   | Expeditionary operational force with maritime soul.                         |
| Comparison 1 – Landpower & Army Special Forces                           | (1)- Provides tactical engagement while signaling commitment. <sup>12</sup> |
| Comparison 2 –<br>Seapower   | (2)- Avoids direct tactical engagement; signals commitment.                 |
| Comparison 3 – Airpower, Marine Corps & Direct Action Special Operations | (3)- Provides tactical engagement without signaling commitment.             |

| Theorists & Theories                 |   |  |
|--------------------------------------|---|--|
| Thucydides                           | Humans fight for fear, honor, interest.                         |  |
| Sun Tzu                              | Avoid battle; know yourself, know enemy.                        |  |
| Clausewitz: "Iron Calculus"          | Opposition resistance: material capability and will.            |  |
| Clausewitz: "Center of Gravity"      | Win by striking opposition power hub.                           |  |
| Clausewitz: "Friction"               | Physical and psychological factors inhibit war.                 |  |
| BH Liddell Hart                      | For victory: dislocate opponent, then exploit.                  |  |
| JC Wylie                             | Sequential and cumulative strategies for control.               |  |
| Albert T. Mahan                      | Command of the sea brings victory.                              |  |
| Julian Corbett                       | Seapower: for influencing events on land.                       |  |
| Giulio Douhet                        | Indiscriminate strategic bombing forces political capitulation. |  |
| John Warden                          | Node strikes induce opposition systems paralysis.               |  |
| Robert Pape                          | Air-ground integration works; decapitation does not.            |  |
| Geostrategy                          | Geography constrains, influences use of force.                  |  |
| Strategic Culture                    | Inherited beliefs, assumptions about using force.               |  |
| Erosion Strategy                     | Target adversary will to continue struggle. <sup>13</sup>       |  |
| Incapacitation or Disarming Strategy | Target adversary capacity to continue struggle. <sup>14</sup>   |  |
| Deterrence                           | Discourage through fear; cost exceeds benefit.                  |  |
| Coercion                             | Threaten force to influence voluntary agent. <sup>15</sup>      |  |
| Irregular Victory                    | Irregulars win substituting will for resources. <sup>16</sup>   |  |
| War Termination                      | War converges actor aims to compromise. <sup>17</sup>           |  |

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> Army Doctrinal Publication 1, *The Army* 

Geoffrey Till, Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> Matt Cavanaugh, "Simplifying Strategic Concepts," WarCouncil.org

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> Christopher Bassford, "The Relationship Between Political Objectives and Military Objectives in War"

<sup>14</sup> Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> Lawrence Freedman, *Deterrence* 

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> Malcolm Gladwell, "How David Beats Goliath," The New Yorker

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> Roger Spiller, Between War and Peace: How America Ends its Wars